Markets and Democracy Participation, Accountability and Efficiency Edited by Samuel Bowles University of Massachusetts, Amherst Herbert Gintis University of Massachusetts, Amherst Bo Gustafsson Uppsala Universitet, Sweden Paperback
Published June 2008 $60.00 (Z)
This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable, and, if so, what strategic changes might be required to regulate the market- based interaction of economic agents. The contributors bring contemporary microeconomic theory to bear in an attempt to find a progressive replacement to traditional state socialism. Various approaches to the study of economic interaction are considered in an attempt to understand the relationship between power and efficiency in market economies.
List of figures; List of tables; Preface Bo Gustafsson; 1. Post-Walrasian political economy Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; Part I. Agency, Incentives, and Democratic Accountability: 2. The democratic firm: an agency-theoretic evaluation Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis; 3. Alternative employment and payment systems D. M. Nuti; Part II. Institutions and Institutional Change: 4. Toward a framework for analyzing institutions and institutional change Leonid Hurwicz; 5. Imperfect choice and rule-governed behaviour Ronald A. Heiner; 6. Organizational equilibria and institutional stability Ugo Pagano; 7. Agency problems and the future of comparative systemsâ€™ theory Mieke Meurs; Part III. Conditions For the Success of the Democratic Firm: 8. After the employment relation: problems on the road to enterprise democracy Louis Putterman; 9. Unions versus cooperatives Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein; 10. Demand variability and work organization David I. Levine; 11. Democracy versus appropriability: can labor-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world? Gregory K. Dow; Part IV. Productivity, Distribution, and Power: 12. Cooperation, conflict, and control in organizations Avner Ben-Ner; 13. Wage bargaining and the choice of production technique in capitalist firms Gilbert L. Skillmand and Harl E. Ryder; Part V. Ownership, Participation, and Capital Markets: 14. The motivational role of an external agent in the informationally-participatory firm Masahiko Aoki; 15. Unstable ownership Tone Ogedal; 16. The simple analytics of a membership market in a labor-managed economy Ernst Fehr; Part VI. Political Democracy and Economic Democracy: 17. Investment planning in market socialism Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin, John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre; 18. Capitalism and Democracy: a summing up of the arguments Martin L. Weitzman; Bibliography; Author Index; Subject index.
'...Markets and Democracy is the sort of collection many readers will find useful.' Journal of Economic Literature
'The book contains much else of interest including a substantial, unified bibliography. In spite of the game-theoretic approach, I learned a lot from it. Because of the game-theoretic approach, orthodox economists will too.' William M. Dugger, Journal of Economic Issues
Bo Gustafsson, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, D. M. Nuti, Leonid Hurwicz, Ronald A. Heiner, Ugo Pagano, Mieke Meurs, Louis Putterman, Karl Ove Moene, Michael Wallerstein, David I. Levine, Gregory K. Dow, Avner Ben-Ner, Gilbert L. Skillmand, Harl E. Ryder, Masahiko Aoki, Tone Ogedal, Ernst Fehr, Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin, John E. Roemer, Joaquim Silvestre, Martin L. Weitzman